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ABSTRACT 
Consistent with its goals of encouraging innovation and 
enhancing consumer welfare, antitrust law generally does not 
compel a firm to give access to the very assets that are the source of 
a firm’s competitive advantage, including a firm’s intellectual 
property, unless a firm has illegitimately gained some edge in the 
market. And yet, in the context of merger review, compulsory 
licenses are a fairly common remedy. The Federal Trade 
Commission and Department of Justice do not impose a compulsory 
license in every case, but the principles guiding the decision are not 
entirely clear. 
This Article is suspicious of the benefits of a compulsory license 
and concerned about the costs. Ultimately, the agencies use 
compulsory licenses as a remedial tool to change the post-merger 
market dynamics. Although a remedial compulsory license may 
achieve the goal of restoring competition lost as a result of the 
merger, it may also undermine the merged firm’s incentives to 
innovate. This may undo the very benefits and efficiencies the 
merger hoped to achieve. 
To take account of the uncertain effects of a compulsory license, 
this Article suggests the agencies adopt a decision-theoretic 
approach to the remedy phase of a merger analysis. The Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines issued in 2010 adopt an approach for reviewing 
mergers consistent with a decision-theoretic approach. But that 
process stops short of considering the potential effects of a proposed 
remedial mechanism. This Article recommends that the agencies 
extend the decision-theoretic analysis implicit in the revised Merger 
Guidelines and include consideration of the possible outcomes that 
can result if a potential remedy is chosen, the likelihood of those 
outcomes, as well as the magnitude of harm and benefits that will 
follow if those outcomes should come to pass. A decision-theoretic 
approach will enable the reviewing agency to take better account of 
the potential, but uncertain, outcomes of a potential remedy. 
Moreover, such an approach will discipline the agencies’ decision-
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making processes, ensuring that remedies are imposed only when 
they are actually likely to benefit consumers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, it has become generally accepted that the 
intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws serve the common 
goals of encouraging innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.
1
 
The intellectual property laws encourage investments in the 
creation, dissemination, and commercialization of original works 
and inventions by securing for authors and inventors, for a limited 
time, the exclusive right to exploit their works.
2
 At the same time, 
the antitrust laws attempt to encourage innovation by promoting 
competition among firms and rewarding the winners of that 
competition with legitimately earned monopoly profits, as 
explained by the Supreme Court in Verizon Communications Inc. 
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP: 
The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a 
short period—is what attracts “business acumen” in the 
first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation 
and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to 
innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be 
found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of 
anticompetitive conduct.
3
 
A firm may acquire monopoly power—i.e., the ability to 
charge supra-competitive prices, reduce output, or otherwise harm 
consumer welfare—a number of ways, including by establishing 
facilities, personnel, and other assets that enable the firm to 
                                                                                                             
 1. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ECONOMIC 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 174 (1999) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT] (“The use of antitrust policy as a framework for preserving and 
encouraging innovation[] . . . is a more recent development . . . .”); see also id. at 
182 (“On the surface, a tension exists between intellectual property protection and 
competition policy: one grants exclusive rights that confer a limited, temporary 
monopoly; the other seeks to keep monopoly at bay. But at a more basic level the 
two areas of policy have a common goal: to enhance economic performance and 
consumer welfare.”); DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995) 
[hereinafter LICENSING GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
public/guidelines/0558.htm (“The intellectual property laws and antitrust laws 
share the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer 
welfare.”); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 
(Fed. Cir. 1990), quoted in LICENSING GUIDELINES at 2 n.7 (“[T]he aims and 
objectives of patent and antitrust law may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds. 
However, the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at 
encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art I., § 8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 271 (2011); 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 106–122, 501 (2011); see also LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 2. 
 3. 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). 
608 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
produce goods or services that are uniquely suited to customers or 
by controlling intellectual property that is required to produce such 
goods or services. Consistent with its goal of safeguarding a firm’s 
incentives to innovate and thereby achieve monopoly profits, 
antitrust law generally does not compel a firm to give access to the 
very assets that are the source of the firm’s competitive 
advantage,
4
 including a firm’s intellectual property, unless a firm 
has illegitimately gained some edge in the market by engaging in 
conduct other than competing on the merits.
5
 More specifically, 
antitrust law generally does not require a firm to license its 
intellectual property to a firm that it otherwise would not.
6
 Stated 
another way, there is no general duty to deal on the part of 
intellectual property rights holders, and a firm’s denial to a 
competitor of a license to its intellectual property is virtually 
privileged.
7
 
And yet, in the context of mergers, compulsory licenses are a 
fairly common remedy.
8
 This may reflect a generally held belief 
that, at least as a merger remedy, a compulsory license does not 
significantly undermine innovation incentives, and when 
considered together with the license’s potential benefits—for 
example, the ability to create more competition relatively easily—
such a license may actually effect a net benefit.
9
 The prevalence of 
compulsory licenses might also reflect the agencies’ prior, failed 
                                                                                                             
 4. See id. at 407–08. 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 407. 
 6. See, e.g., LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 4; cf. Phillip Areeda, 
Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 841, 852 (1989) (“Compulsory access[] . . . is and should be very 
exceptional.”). This is consistent with patent law. See Dawson Chemical Co. v. 
Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (“Compulsory licensing is a 
rarity in our patent system . . . .”). 
 7. But see Ebay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) 
(holding that, where defendant has been found to infringe, intellectual property 
owner does not have an automatic right to permanent injunction, thereby leaving 
open the possibility that an infringer can extract a license from an intellectual 
property owner that would otherwise choose not to deal with the infringer). 
 8. Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Anntitrust Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Presentation at the British Inst. of Int’l and Comparative Law, 
Forcing Firms to Share the Sandbox: Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual 
Property Rights and Antitrust 1 (May 10, 2004). 
 9. See Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 
74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 62 (2007) (“[C]ompulsory licensing as a remedy that 
allows a merger to go through may not weaken innovation incentives and 
theoretically could even increase them.”). Cf. Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond 
Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 
575, 600 & n.70 (2007) (arguing that merger enforcement, in general, will not 
significantly undermine innovation incentives). 
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challenges and, based on that experience, their prediction that a 
challenge on similar grounds is likely to be unsuccessful or create 
bad precedent. Indeed, rather than challenge the 2011 Google-ITA 
merger—which, as initially presented to the DOJ, was very likely 
to result in anticompetitive effects with no clear, mitigating 
efficiencies
10—the DOJ proposed a settlement that, among other 
things, required Google to continue to license ITA’s software 
system; in its competitive impact statement outlining the proposed 
settlement, the DOJ explained that “[t]he United States 
considered[] . . . seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions 
against [Google’s and ITA’s] transaction and proceeding to a full 
trial on the merits,” but ultimately it settled with the parties in part 
because it would allow the agency to “avoid[] the time, expense, 
and uncertainty of a full trial on the merits.”11 
Or it may reflect the fact that assessing the net value of any 
remedy, including a compulsory license, involves a great deal of 
uncertainty about the remedy’s future effects on the relevant 
market or markets. Without a systematic way of dealing with this 
uncertainty, it may be very difficult to appreciate fully the 
remedy’s benefits and costs. As a result, both the agencies and the 
merging firms may underestimate the remedy’s effects, whether 
beneficial or harmful. To be sure, the agencies do not impose a 
compulsory license in every case.
12
 But the principles guiding the 
decision between seeking and not seeking a compulsory license are 
not entirely clear. 
                                                                                                             
 10. Google planned to enter the “comparative flight search market.” A 
necessary input in that market is a software system that enables complex and 
customized flight search queries. Most of the firms competing in the 
comparative flight search market relied on ITA’s software system, QPX, which 
essentially established QPX as the industry standard. Unremedied, the merger 
would have enabled Google to deprive comparative flight search market 
competitors, such as Kayak, TripAdvisor, and Bing Travel, of access to a 
necessary input—QPX—thereby foreclosing rivals from the market.  See 
Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Google Inc., NO. 1:11-CV-
00688 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ 
f269600/269620.pdf; Complaint, United States v. Google Inc., NO. 1:11-CV-
00688, ¶¶ 36–40 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/cases/f269600/269618.pdf. 
 11. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Google Inc., supra note 
10, at 16. 
 12. See Statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris in the Matter of Genzyme 
Corporation/Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc., File No. 021-0026, at 6 (FTC Jan. 
13, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/murisgenzymestmt.pdf; 
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, Genzyme 
Corporation’s Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals Inc., File No. 021-0026 
(FTC Jan. 13, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/thompson 
genzymestmt.pdf. 
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This Article is suspicious of the benefits of a compulsory 
license and concerned about the costs of such a remedy. A 
compulsory license ultimately seeks to prevent a merger from 
harming consumers by restoring the competition lost as a result of 
the merger. The general idea is that more competitors are better 
than fewer competitors, and having market participants with a 
relatively small share of the market is better than having the 
market concentrated in the hands of a few. This principle generally 
holds true when the underlying competitive concern is the price 
and output effects in the market: More competition among less 
powerful firms generally benefits consumers in the form of lower 
prices. But when the underlying concern is the innovation effects 
in the market, the principle is less well established.
13
 Neither 
theoretical nor empirical studies unambiguously conclude that 
more competition results in more innovation and greater benefits to 
consumers.
14
 Therefore, at least where a merger has the potential to 
effect innovation benefits, it is far from clear that a compulsory 
license will always result in a net benefit to consumers. 
To take account of the uncertain effects of a compulsory 
license in a systematic manner, this Article suggests that the 
agencies’ decision-making process should be guided by the 
principles of decision theory and expected utility theory. 
Specifically, this Article recommends the agencies conduct a 
thorough, fact-intensive analysis of a compulsory license’s 
potentially beneficial and harmful effects in the relevant market or 
markets. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued in 2010 adopt 
an approach for reviewing mergers that is consistent with a 
decision-theoretic approach and with the suggestions of Katz & 
Shelanski in a paper that pre-dates the revisions to the Merger 
Guidelines. But the revised Merger Guidelines stop short of 
considering the potential effects of a proposed remedial 
mechanism. This Article recommends that the agencies extend the 
decision-theoretic analysis implicit in the revised Merger 
Guidelines and include consideration of the possible outcomes that 
can result if a potential remedy is chosen, the likelihood of those 
outcomes, and the magnitude of harm and benefits that will follow 
should those outcomes come to pass. A decision-theoretic 
approach will enable the reviewing agency to take better account 
of the potential, but uncertain, outcomes of a proposed remedy. 
Moreover, such an approach will discipline the agencies’ decision-
making process, ensuring that a remedy is imposed only when the 
agencies expect the remedy to benefit consumers. 
                                                                                                             
 13. See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, at 14. 
 14. Id. at 19; ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 176. 
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This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I briefly describes the 
merger review process. It explains the filing requirements of the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act, pursuant to which 
most mergers are reviewed. In addition, Part I summarizes the 
merger review process under the recently revised Merger 
Guidelines, pointing out some notable differences between them 
and the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. One difference is the 
greater emphasis on innovation effects. Because compulsory 
licenses can cause their own innovation effects, the revised Merger 
Guidelines’ new emphasis should enable a more thorough analysis 
of both the harmful and beneficial effects of compulsory licenses. 
Taking account of those effects is not a straightforward task, 
however, and Part I discusses some of the difficulties. 
If a merger analysis indicates that a merger is likely to be 
anticompetitive, the reviewing agency must fashion an appropriate 
remedy. Part II considers the various remedies the reviewing 
agency can impose, including a compulsory license. Compulsory 
licenses may be a particularly attractive remedy not only because 
they can lower barriers to entry and lower the costs of an existing 
competitor, but also because they can be implemented at a very 
low cost to the merging firms. At the same time, however, 
compulsory licenses may undermine the incentives of the merged 
firm, the licensee, and other market participants to innovate. These 
costs and benefits are considered in greater detail in Part II. 
Part III suggests that, in order to take full account of the 
potential harms and benefits of a compulsory license, the agencies 
should adopt a decision-theoretic approach to the remedy phase of 
a merger analysis. Part III briefly describes decision theory and 
then applies it to the remedy phase of an actual merger case, in 
which the FTC considered, but rejected, a compulsory license as a 
potential remedy. 
Finally, Part IV draws some general conclusions, resulting in 
three model scenarios. In two scenarios—where the expected 
innovation effects are either harmful or nonexistent—a compulsory 
license as a remedial mechanism is likely unproblematic. But when 
a merger is likely to benefit innovation while at the same time 
raising concerns about price and output effects, the agencies should 
undertake a more thorough analysis using the tools of decision 
theory. 
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I. MERGER REVIEW  
A. The Hart–Scott–Rodino Filing Requirement 
The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice 
review most mergers pursuant to the Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust 
Improvement Act of 1976 (HSR Act), although the agencies may 
review unconsummated mergers that do not meet the HSR Act’s 
filing requirements at the request of the merging firms, as well as 
challenge mergers after they have been consummated.
15
 Generally, 
under the HSR Act, mergers that exceed a certain value or involve 
firms exceeding a certain size
16
 must be submitted to the DOJ’s 
Antitrust Division and the FTC for one of the two agencies to 
review.
17
 Staff from both agencies consult “and the matter is 
‘cleared’ to one agency or the other for review.”18 
Once the parties have complied with the necessary filing 
requirements, there is a 30-day waiting period.
19
 The agency to 
which the matter is cleared may do one of three things: 
(1) terminate the waiting period prior to the passing of 30 days, 
thereby permitting the merger to proceed early;
20
 (2) allow the 30 
days to expire, at which time the firms are permitted to 
consummate the merger;
21
 or (3) make what is known as a “second 
request”—i.e., request additional information from the merging 
firms.
22
 If the agency makes a second request, there is an 
additional waiting period, after which the agency may permit the 
merger to proceed, challenge the merger, or take some other type 
of remedial action. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006); see, e.g., Complaint, In re Hologic, Inc., No. C-
4165, ¶ 12 (FTC July 7, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/ 
0510263/0510263complaint.pdf. 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(1) (2006). The thresholds for filing are updated 
annually. See id. §§ 18a(2)(A), 19(a)(5). 
 17. Certain transactions, including some transfers of real property and some 
purchases of stock or other assets, are exempt from the filing requirement. See 
id. § 18a(c). 
 18. See FTC GUIDE TO THE ANTITRUST LAWS, MERGERS: PREMERGER 
NOTIFICATION AND THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http:// 
www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/premerger_notification.shtm.  
 19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a(a) & (b)(1). In the case of a cash tender offer, the 
waiting period is 15 days. Id. § 18a(b)(1)(B). 
 20. Id. § 18a(b)(2). 
 21. Id. §§ 18a(a) & (b)(1). 
 22. Id. § 18a(e)(1)(A). 
2012] COMPULSORY LICENSING AS MERGER REMEDY 613 
 
 
 
B. Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
1. Merger Analysis Under the Merger Guidelines 
The agencies review mergers consistent with the tools and 
techniques articulated in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In the 
fall of 2009, the FTC and the DOJ set out to revise the Merger 
Guidelines, soliciting public comment and holding a number of 
public workshops around the country.
23
 In August 2010, the 
agencies issued the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (the 
“revised Merger Guidelines”).24 The agencies revised the review 
process in some notable ways that could affect the way a remedy 
like a compulsory license could be evaluated.
 25
 
Generally speaking, the revised Merger Guidelines seek to 
identify mergers before they are consummated that are likely to 
enable a firm (or firms) to raise prices, reduce output, diminish 
innovation, or otherwise harm consumers.
26
 Merger analysis 
contemplates two types of competitive effects: “unilateral effects” 
and “coordinated effects.” A merger may enhance the ability of the 
merged firm to exercise market power profitably without the need 
to cooperate with other firms in the market; these types of 
competitive effects are referred to as unilateral effects.
27
 A merger 
may also make more likely “the risk of coordinated, 
                                                                                                             
 23. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice, Federal Trade 
Commission and Department of Justice to Hold Workshops Concerning 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
opa/2009/09/mgr.shtm; see also Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hmg/index.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2010). 
 24. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (2010) [hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf. 
 25. The revised Guidelines encourage the courts to look to the Guidelines 
for assistance when considering merger challenges. See Id. § 1 (“[The Merger 
Guidelines] may also assist the courts in developing an appropriate framework 
for interpreting and applying the antitrust laws in the horizontal merger 
context.”). At the time of this writing, only a handful of courts have considered 
an agency challenge to a merger under the revised Guidelines; all of those courts 
appear to have cited the revised Guidelines approvingly, but none has 
undertaken an in-depth analysis of the techniques articulated in the Guidelines.  
See United States v. H & R Block, Inc., __ F. Supp. 2d __ (D.D.C. 2011), No. 
11-00948, 2011 WL 5438955 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2011); F.T.C. v. ProMedica 
Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:11 CV 47, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011); 
F.T.C. v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No. SACV 10-1873 (AG), 2011 WL 3100372, at 
*14, *18–20 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011); see also Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 
F.3d 182, 211 n.10 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing revised Guidelines in a private suit). 
 26. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 1. 
 27. Id. 
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accommodating, or interdependent behavior among rivals”—the 
classic example is price fixing; competitive effects resulting from 
this type of conduct are referred to as coordinated effects.
28
 
One of the most noteworthy changes to the merger review 
process is the emphasis on evaluating the likely competitive effects 
of a merger by whatever method suits the given facts and 
circumstances. Unlike the 1992 Merger Guidelines, which describe 
a single, sequential process for analyzing mergers, the revised 
Merger Guidelines caution, “merger analysis does not consist of 
uniform application of a single methodology.”29 While the 1992 
Merger Guidelines rely principally on market definition, the 
revised Merger Guidelines describe a variety of analytical tools 
and techniques and types of evidence on which the enforcement 
agencies may rely in evaluating whether a merger is likely to result 
in anticompetitive effects.
30
 
Perhaps most significantly, the agencies incorporated into the 
Merger Guidelines a more refined method for evaluating unilateral 
effects. The analysis begins by determining the extent to which the 
merging firms are direct competitors with each other, in contrast to 
attempting to define an entire market of products that encompasses 
one or both of the merging firms’ products.31 The revised Merger 
Guidelines recognize that “[t]he elimination of competition 
between two firms that results from their merger may alone 
constitute a substantial lessening of competition.”32 In particular, 
where the products of the merging firms are close substitutes, the 
elimination of competition between those products is more likely 
to result in anticompetitive effects than where the products are 
more distant substitutes. The merged firm can profitably raise 
prices on the product of one of the merging firms because some of 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. § 4 (“Some of the analytical tools used by the Agencies to assess 
competitive effects do not rely on market definition . . . .”). 
 31. Id. § 6 (“The extent of direct competition between the products sold by 
the merging parties is central to the evaluation of unilateral price effects.”). This 
method was first tested by the FTC in FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 
F.3d 1028, 1037–41 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 
2008), which pre-dates the revisions to the Merger Guidelines. The Merger 
Guidelines were revised to reflect this, and other, agency practices. See Carl 
Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Econ., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the American Bar Association Section of 
Antitrust Law Fall Forum, Update from the Antitrust Division 13 (Nov. 18, 
2010) (“From the outset, a primary motivation in revising the Guidelines was to 
promote transparency by describing more accurately how the Agencies actually 
evaluate horizontal mergers.”). 
 32. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 6. 
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the sales lost as a result of the price increase will be “recaptured” 
by increased sales for the product of the other merging partner. The 
more closely the two products compete, the more lost sales the 
merged firm will recapture.
33
 
The agencies may seek to quantify the extent to which the 
products of the merging firms compete, using a number of 
measures.
34
 These measures do not necessarily require the agencies 
to define the relevant market first (as the 1992 Merger Guidelines 
do); however, defining the relevant market is eventually necessary 
at some point in the analysis.
35
 
Another notable revision to the Guidelines is the recognition—
consistent with agency practice—that the agencies may assess how 
customers are likely to respond by considering any available and 
reasonable evidence. This can include measures derived from the 
application of technical tools introduced in the revised Guidelines,
36
 
as well as evidence of competitive effects
37
 and “historical events, or 
‘natural experiments’.”38 The agencies’ use of these measures will 
                                                                                                             
 33. Id. § 6.1. The revised Merger Guidelines further explain, “Substantial 
unilateral price elevation post-merger for a product formerly sold by one of the 
merging firms normally requires that a significant fraction of the customers 
purchasing that product view products formerly sold by the other merging firm 
as their next-best choice.” Id. 
 34. Two measures introduced in the revised Guidelines are the diversion 
ratio and the value of diverted sales. The diversion ratio evaluates the extent to 
which a price increase on the product of one of the merging firms causes 
consumers to switch to the product of the other merging firm, as compared to 
the products of all other firms and as measured in terms of unit sales. In 
comparison, the value of diverted sales evaluates the extent to which the two 
firms compete by measuring the “boost” to profits that could result from a price 
increase, which may also indicate the “upward pricing pressure.” See id. For a 
more detailed discussion regarding the application of the upward pricing 
pressure measure, see Shapiro, supra note 31, at 23–24 & nn.32–33. 
 35. The revised Guidelines note, “Some of the analytical tools used by the 
Agencies to assess competitive effects do not rely on market definition,” but 
“evaluation of competitive alternatives available to customers”—i.e., defining 
the relevant market—“is always necessary at some point in the analysis.” 2010 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 4. Defining the relevant 
market involves identifying the “set of products that are reasonably 
interchangeable with a product sold by one of the merging firms”—i.e., the 
substitutes—by application of what is known as the hypothetical monopolist 
test. Id. § 4.1.1. The methodology for defining the relevant market and its 
application are described more thoroughly in Section 4.1 of the 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines. 
 36. See id. § 4.1.3. 
 37. Id. § 4.  
 38. This includes evidence related to the impact of recent mergers, entry, or 
exit in the relevant market, as well as evidence in analogous markets. See id. 
§ 2.1.2; see also FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1073–80 (D.D.C. 
1997) (concluding from pricing data that the relevant market was “the sale of 
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likely result in more narrowly defined markets than markets defined 
under the 1992 Merger Guidelines which did not recognize such 
techniques.
39
 
Once the relevant market is defined, the market participants 
and their relative shares of the market are identified
40
 and the 
concentration of the market and the coordinated effects of the 
merger are evaluated using the same method outlined in the 1992 
Merger Guidelines: the Hefindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is 
calculated,
41
 and both the post-merger HHI and the change in the 
HHI are evaluated. The 2010 Merger Guidelines revised the 
thresholds that give rise to a presumption of competitive concern 
or harm.
42
 The figure on the following page summarizes these 
presumptions. 
  
                                                                                                             
 
consumable office supplies through office superstores” and that Staples and 
Office Depot focused “primarily on competition from other superstores”); FTC 
v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, (D.C. Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 
548 F.3d 1028, 1037–41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (concluding that “premium, natural, 
and organic supermarkets” is a relevant market for “core customers,” relying, in  
part, on the FTC’s evidence that Wild Oats constrained the prices at Whole 
Foods in geographic markets where both grocery stores were located). 
 39. Defining markets more narrowly appears to be one of the aims of the 
revised Merger Guidelines: “Defining a market broadly to include relatively 
distant product or geographic substitutes can lead to misleading market shares.” 
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 4. 
 40. For a detailed explanation of how the agencies identify market 
participants and calculate market shares, see Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, respectively. 
 41. The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the market participants’ 
market shares. For example, in a market with five firms having an equal share of 
the relevant market, the HHI is 2000 (20
2
 + 20
2
 + 20
2
 + 20
2
 + 20
2
 = 2000). 
 42. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 5.3. 
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In comparison to the 1992 Merger Guidelines, the revised 
Guidelines tolerate greater changes in concentration as well as 
greater absolute concentration before giving rise to a presumption 
that the merger is anticompetitive. 
As under the 1992 Merger Guidelines, if a competitive effects 
analysis under the revised Merger Guidelines indicates that the 
merger under review is likely to harm consumers, the agencies will 
consider a number of mitigating factors, including whether the 
merger induces timely, likely, and sufficient entry into the relevant 
market or repositioning by existing competitors and whether the 
merger will achieve significant efficiencies.
43
 The agencies will 
consider only efficiencies that are “merger-specific”—i.e., unable 
to be achieved without the merger or by another means that does 
not have the same anticompetitive effects. 
Another feature of the Guidelines that remains unchanged is 
the requirement that efficiencies likely to benefit consumers in one 
relevant market cannot be used to offset anticompetitive harms in 
another market.
44
 The retention of the “no-cross-market-balancing” 
rule is unspectacular given that the rule has its origins in the 
Supreme Court’s decision, United States v. Philadelphia National 
                                                                                                             
 43. See id. §§ 9, 10. 
 44. See id. § 10. 
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Bank.
45
 But when considered together with the revised Merger 
Guidelines’ greater emphasis on innovation effects—which can 
arise in different markets and over a different time horizon than do 
price and output effects—it is not clear how the agencies will 
conduct a competitive effects analysis.
46
 
2. The Specific Case of Innovation Under the Merger 
Guidelines 
One notable revision to the Merger Guidelines is the greater 
emphasis on determining a merger’s effects on innovation.47 The 
Merger Guidelines make clear that a competitive effects analysis 
of a merger includes consideration not only of price and output 
effects but also innovation effects.
48
 Moreover, the revised Merger 
Guidelines consider both anti- and procompetitive innovation 
effects. With respect to anticompetitive innovation effects, a 
unilateral effects analysis considers whether the merger is likely to 
diminish innovation competition by encouraging the merged firm 
to cut back its innovation efforts.
49
 For example, a merger may 
diminish innovation where one of the merging firms has a product 
under development that would directly compete with a product of 
the other merging firm. Likewise, a merger may diminish 
innovation where one of the merging firms has R&D capabilities 
that could have been employed to develop a product that directly 
                                                                                                             
 45. 374 U.S. 321, 370–71 (1963) (rejecting consideration of efficiencies 
outside of the relevant market in which anticompetitive effects are anticipated). 
 46. The Merger Guidelines appear to recognize the hurdle posed by the no-
cross-market-balancing rule, noting that “[i]n some cases[] . . . the Agencies in 
their prosecutorial discretion will consider efficiencies not strictly in the relevant 
market, but so inextricably linked with it” that a remedy could not “eliminate the 
anticompetitive effects in the market without sacrificing the efficiencies in the 
other market(s).” However, how this principle will apply in practice is unclear. 
See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 10 n.14. 
It should also be noted that new methods of analysis introduced in the revised 
Merger Guidelines—specifically, evaluating a merger’s likely anticompetitive 
effects by measuring the value of diverted sales—is likely to result in more 
narrowly defined markets, increasing the likelihood that a merger will produce 
efficiencies in a market that is considered outside the market in which the 
anticompetitive effects are anticipated. How the revised Guidelines will deal 
with this issue is also unclear. See Joshua D. Wright, Comment on the Proposed 
Update on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Accounting for Out-of-Market 
Efficiencies (George Mason University Law & Economics, Research Paper No. 
10-38, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1656538. 
 47. See Shapiro, supra note 31, at 29–30. 
 48. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, §§ 1, 6, 6.4, 10. 
 49. Id. § 6.4. 
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competes with a product of the other merging firm. In both cases, 
the merged firm’s incentive to innovate is diminished because the 
product resulting from the innovation will essentially cannibalize 
the sales of another product of the merged firm.
50
 
The Guidelines make clear, however, that a unilateral effects 
analysis of a merger considers not only harm to innovation but also 
benefits to innovation. For example, the combining of 
complementary R&D capabilities through merger may enable 
beneficial innovation that would otherwise not be possible.
51
 
3. Price and Output Effects Versus Innovation Effects 
Discerning when a merger is likely to enable innovation, rather 
than diminish it, is not a straightforward task. The Merger 
Guidelines proceed from the assumption that greater market 
concentration reduces competition and therefore reduces consumer 
welfare.
52
 
When the underlying concern is whether a merger will 
diminish or enhance the merged firm’s incentive to innovate, 
however, the presumption that increased market concentration is 
harmful to consumers does not necessarily hold.
53
 
There is a longstanding debate among economists and antitrust 
scholars about whether increased market concentration or intense 
competition is the ideal market condition for promoting 
innovation. One view, known as the “Schumpeterian” view, is that 
                                                                                                             
 50. See id. § 6.4 (explaining that innovation is likely to be diminished where 
a product under development or a future innovation initiative of one of the 
merging firms is likely to “capture substantial revenues” from the other merging 
firm (“The Agencies evaluate the extent to which successful innovation by one 
merging firm is likely to take sales from the other, and the extent to which post-
merger incentives for future innovation will be lower than those that would 
prevail in the absence of the merger.”)). 
 51. See id.; see also Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, at 50–51. Katz & 
Shelanski explain that, in some instances, mergers—in contrast to other means 
for combining complementary assets, such as joint ventures or cross-licensing 
agreements—can reduce transaction costs. See id.; see also OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS (1975), discussed in Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, at 50–51. In 
those instances, the efficiencies would be “merger specific” and cognizable 
under the Merger Guidelines. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 
supra note 24, § 10 & n.13. 
 52. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 2.1.3 
(“Mergers that cause a significant increase in concentration and result in highly 
concentrated markets are presumed to be likely to enhance market power, but 
this presumption can be rebutted by persuasive evidence showing that the 
merger is unlikely to enhance market power.”). 
 53. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 174–75. 
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monopoly is the engine of progress.
54
 This view has its roots in the 
writings of Joseph Schumpeter, who argued that capitalism 
develops through cycles of “creative destruction,” whereby old 
technologies reign superior only temporarily, until they are 
displaced by new and improved technologies.
55
 The true 
champions of this “evolutionary process,” suggested Schumpeter, 
are large firms with market power. Indeed, Schumpeter wrote, 
“perfect competition is not only impossible but inferior, and has no 
title to being set up as a model of ideal efficiency.”56 The rationale, 
offered by Schumpeter and others, is that firms with market power 
are more capable of funding research and development and 
attracting outside capital investment, and supra-competitive profits 
better enable firms to recoup their investment and undertake long-
range planning.
57
 
In contrast, writing in 1962, Kenneth Arrow suggested that, at 
least with respect to an existing product market, a monopolist has 
less incentive to innovate than does a firm operating in a 
competitive market.
58
 The monopolist has less incentive because, 
as the sole supplier already earning monopoly profits, the 
monopolist’s post-innovation profits will come at the cost of its 
pre-innovation profits.
59
 Stated another way, the monopolist’s 
post-innovation sales and the corresponding profits will essentially 
cannibalize most, if not all, of its pre-innovation sales and profits. 
For example, consider a monopolist that develops a cost-reducing 
innovation. Pre-innovation, the monopolist earns $1,000 in profit, 
and post-innovation, it earns $1,300 in profit. The monopolist’s 
incentive to innovate is the difference between the post-innovation 
profits and the pre-innovation profits—$300. In contrast, consider 
a firm operating in a market that is competitive but otherwise the 
same in all respects as the monopoly market, and the firm develops 
the same cost-reducing innovation. Consider further that the 
innovation reduces the firm’s costs sufficiently such that the post-
innovation profit-maximizing price is less than the pre-innovation 
                                                                                                             
 54. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY 106 (3d ed. 1950). 
 55. See id. at 81–106. 
 56. Id. at 106 (“The firm of the type that is compatible with perfect 
competition is in many cases inferior in internal, especially technological, 
efficiency.”). 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 81–106; ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra 
note 1, at 176. 
 58. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 619–22 (1962). 
 59. See id. at 620 (“The preinvention monopoly power acts as a strong 
disincentive to further innovation.”). 
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marginal cost. Pre-innovation, the firm prices at marginal cost and 
profit is $0. Post-innovation, however, the firm will be able to 
price at the post-innovation monopoly price. Because the post-
innovation monopoly price is below the pre-innovation marginal 
cost, the firm will capture all of the market and earn $1,300 in 
profits. The competitive firm’s incentive to innovate is therefore 
$1,300—the difference between the pre- and post-innovation 
profits.
60
 Although the post-innovation profits are the same for the 
monopolist and the competitive firm, their incentives are different.  
These two competing theories gave way to an extensive 
theoretical and empirical literature that sought to identify a 
relationship between innovation on the one hand, and market, firm, 
or industry characteristics on the other hand.
61
 Some scholars have 
attempted to identify unifying principles throughout the 
literature.
62
 In general, however, these studies are inconclusive and 
cannot support systemic presumptions about a merger’s effects on 
innovation.
63
 Specifically, enforcement agencies cannot presume a 
merger is likely to harm innovation merely from the fact that the 
merger will diminish competition between the merging firms. Katz 
and Shelanski suggest that one exception is a merger to monopoly, 
and, in that case, a presumption of harm is justified.
64
 In all other 
cases in which the merging parties claim innovation efficiencies 
                                                                                                             
 60. See id. If the post-innovation monopoly price is greater than the pre-
innovation marginal cost, the competitive firm will be constrained by, and will 
not charge more than, the competitive price. However, the competitive firm’s 
incentive remains greater than the monopolist’s. See id. at 621. 
 61. For a survey of the theoretical and economic literature, see, e.g., Katz & 
Shelanski, supra note 9, at 17–30; Baker, supra note 9, at 577–86; Richard 
Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-
Innovation Debate?, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159 (Adam 
B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2006). 
 62. See Baker, supra note 9, at 579–83. 
 63. See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, at 17–30, 27 (“[T]he available data 
and theory show it is impossible to make definitive general statements about the 
linkage between market structure and innovation . . . .”); ECONOMIC REPORT OF 
THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 176; Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, 
Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, 
Global Marketplace (1996) [hereinafter Global Marketplace Report], Vol. I, Ch. 
6, at 10–11 (“On the possible existence of a causal link between concentration 
and innovation, all [economists] agreed that there is no clear economic theory or 
empiricism to support a general proposition that increased market concentration 
leads to reduced innovation activity.”), Ch. 7, at 16. 
 64. Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, passim; see also Global Marketplace 
Report, supra note 63, Vol. I, Ch. 7, at 19 (“Several witnesses acknowledged 
that the monopolist’s incentives to eliminate, delay, or reduce innovation [in 
situations that are consistent with Arrow’s theoretical model] would be quite 
clear.”). 
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(or the agency predicts harm to innovation), a fact-intensive, case-
by-case analysis is warranted.
 65
 
The other way in which consideration of innovation effects 
complicates a merger analysis is that a thorough investigation may 
reveal that the varying competitive effects of the merger do not all 
move in the same direction. In some instances, a merger may be 
likely to raise prices and reduce output, while at the same time 
enabling innovation that otherwise would not occur. The difficulty 
arises in determining how to balance short-term price and output 
effects against longer-term innovation effects. The Merger 
Guidelines recognize the possibility that “[a] merger may result in 
different unilateral effects along different dimensions of 
competition”;66 however, they are ambiguous with respect to how 
the agencies will trade between differing types of costs and 
benefits, particularly when those costs and benefits occur in 
different markets. Indeed, on the day the agencies released the 
revised Guidelines, Commissioner Rosch noted that the Guidelines 
failed to address this difficult issue.
67
 
The difficulties in taking innovation effects into account do not 
merely arise at the stage of determining whether, on balance, a 
merger is likely to be anticompetitive or procompetitive. Such 
difficulties will resurface when attempting to fashion an 
appropriate remedy for proposed mergers that the agencies 
determine are likely anticompetitive. In particular, when the 
merger analysis indicates that the merger is likely to result in 
competitive effects in one dimension of competition (e.g., 
anticompetitive price effects) that conflict with competitive effects 
in another dimension of competition (e.g., procompetitive 
innovation effects) and the agency seeks to prevent one type of 
effect while preserving another, crafting an effective remedy may 
be especially difficult. Before proposing and settling on a remedy, 
the agencies should consider the potential remedy’s effects on, not 
one, but all types of competitive effects. Towards that end, the 
agencies should extend the decision-theoretic analysis that is 
apparent in the revised Merger Guidelines and include 
consideration of the potential remedial mechanisms and their 
                                                                                                             
 65. Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, passim. 
 66. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 6.0. 
 67. Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch on the Release of the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Project No. P092900, at 3 (Aug. 19, 2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmgrosch.pdf. Commissioner 
Rosch commented, “the Guidelines do not address some of the key issues 
involving innovation market analysis. For example, how should enforcers resolve 
cases when the predicted price effects of a merge suggest one enforcement 
outcome but the innovation effects suggest a different outcome?” Id. 
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respective uncertain, long–run effects. Decision theory and its 
application to the remedy phase of a merger analysis—and 
specifically its use in determining whether a compulsory license is 
an appropriate merger remedy—is discussed further below, in Part 
III. 
II. MERGER REMEDIES 
A. Injunction, Fix-it-First, Negotiated Settlement 
The revised Merger Guidelines, like their predecessors, do not 
extensively address the issue of remedies.
68
 Nonetheless, the 
enforcement agencies have broad discretion in seeking an 
appropriate remedy. 
Broadly speaking, there are three courses of action the agencies 
may pursue. If there is no remedy available that would preserve 
competition, the agency may seek to block the merger by seeking 
an injunction.
69
 Short of an injunction, the reviewing agency may 
require the merging firms to “fix-it-first”—i.e., to resolve the 
agency’s competitive concerns before the merger is consummated 
and before a complaint is filed.
70
 Alternatively, the agency may 
negotiate a settlement with the parties, resulting in a consent 
decree, which, after an opportunity for public comment and 
possibly modification, is entered by a federal district court and 
becomes a binding court order.
71
 
                                                                                                             
 68. See generally 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24; 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
(1992, rev. 1997) [hereinafter 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], 
available at http://www. ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.shtm. The 2010 Merger 
Guidelines and the 1992 Merger Guidelines hint at potential remedial solutions. 
See, e.g., 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 n.14 (“In some cases, . . . 
the Agencies in their prosecutorial discretion will consider efficiencies not 
strictly in the relevant market, but so inextricably linked with it that a partial 
divestiture or other remedy could not feasibly eliminate the anticompetitive 
effect in the relevant market without sacrificing the efficiencies in the other 
market(s).” (emphasis added)); see also 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 4 n.36. 
 69. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER 
REMEDIES 3 (June 2011), available at www.justice/gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
272350.pdf. 
 70. Id. at 22. 
 71. See id. at 22–24.  Ultimately, a fix-it-first remedy and a negotiated 
settlement attempt to achieve the same thing—to modify the original merger in 
order to mitigate the likely anticompetitive effects of the merger. The only 
difference is that a merger that is “fixed” first never results in a complaint or other 
filing with the court. In general, the agency will opt to file a complaint and enter a 
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In general, full-stop injunctions are less common than 
negotiated settlements or fix-it-first remedies. From 1995 through 
2010, only about 10% of all FTC merger enforcement actions 
resulted in an injunction,
72
 whereas about 25% were “fixed first,” 
and more than 60% resulted in a negotiated settlement.
73
 The 
prevalence of consent decrees can be explained by the HSR Act’s 
premerger notification requirement, which affords the agencies an 
opportunity to review the merger, identify anticompetitive 
concerns, and negotiate a settlement with the merging firms prior 
to the merger’s consummation. As the Bureau of Competition of 
the FTC explained in a 1999 study,  
Commission orders arising out of a merger reported 
pursuant to the HSR Act are almost always negotiated and 
entered prior to consummation of the reported merger. The 
requirement of premerger notification enables the antitrust 
agencies to insist that parties agree to remedies[] . . . before 
they permit the parties to consummate their transaction.
74
 
The virtue of a negotiated settlement and a fix-it-first remedy is 
that they enable the agency to mitigate the expected 
anticompetitive harms while preserving the competitive benefits 
and efficiencies of the merger. Rather than requiring the agency to 
decide the binary issue of whether to approve a merger, as is, or 
enjoin it entirely, a settlement enables the agency to approve the 
merger conditioned upon the fulfillment of certain requirements by 
the merging firms. These requirements can be carefully tailored to 
target the anticompetitive effects of the merger. 
B. Compulsory License 
In negotiating a settlement, one of the conditions the 
enforcement agency can insist on is that the merged firm license 
some or all of its intellectual property to a third party. The FTC 
began experimenting with the use of a compulsory license as a 
                                                                                                             
 
consent decree, rather than agree to a fix-it-first remedy, when the remedy requires 
ongoing monitoring. Id. at 22–23. 
 72. See Federal Trade Commission, FTC Competition Enforcement Database, 
Merger Enforcement Actions, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/caselist/merger/index.shtml. 
There were 342 merger enforcement actions from 1995 through 2010, and only 34 
resulted in an injunction. 
 73. Id. 
 74. STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION OF THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS 3 (1999) [hereinafter 
FTC DIVESTITURE STUDY]. 
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remedial tool in the early 1990s.
75
 Now, it is considered a “well-
established tool” that is “not particularly controversial.”76 
1. Benefits of a Compulsory License 
As a remedial tool, compulsory licensing to the merging firms’ 
intellectual property is appealing for at least three reasons. 
a. Lower Barriers to Entry 
First, a compulsory license can be used to lower barriers to 
entry in the relevant market, thereby facilitating market entry by a 
new firm or product repositioning by an existing competitor.
77
 A 
barrier to entry is a characteristic of a given market that makes it 
more difficult for competitors to enter that market.
78
 Entry barriers 
can be tangible or intangible property, and include obstacles as 
variable as exclusive dealing contracts that prevent new entrants 
from having access to critical inputs; the efficient operation of 
existing competitors; and the possession by existing market 
participants of valuable assets such as equipment, knowledgeable 
and skillful personnel, and other resources that are difficult for new 
entrants to acquire. 
Valuable intellectual property rights can pose a barrier to entry. 
Innovations covered by intellectual property rights can serve as 
upstream inputs into a downstream product, such that without a 
license to the underlying intellectual property, the manufacture and 
sale of the product could be prohibitively expensive.
79
 For 
example, if a firm wanted to enter the market for smartphones—
and compete with Apple’s iPhone, Motorola’s Droid, or Research 
In Motion’s Blackberry, among others—the potential entrant 
would almost certainly be unable to manufacture and sell a 
smartphone without first obtaining a license from one or more 
firms holding patents covering various smartphone functionalities 
and capabilities or inventing around those patents. In either case, 
obtaining access to, and the use of, the needed innovations would 
likely be difficult, requiring the expenditure of a significant 
amount of money, time, and other resources. Entry into the market 
would therefore be difficult. A compulsory license to the patents 
                                                                                                             
 75. See id. at 6. 
 76. Delrahim, supra note 8, at 1. 
 77. See FTC DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 74, at 11. 
 78. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 310 (1978). 
 79. Likewise, inventions covered by valuable intellectual property rights 
can serve as an upstream input into a downstream market for further innovation. 
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covering the inventions embodied in the various smartphone 
functionalities would make entry into the market easier. 
Alternatively, innovations covered by intellectual property 
rights might not, alone, make entry into the relevant market 
difficult or impossible, but they might contribute to entry being 
difficult when combined with other hurdles. For example, consider 
a firm that seeks to enter the market for steel production. The 
potential entrant will obviously need to acquire a steel mill, and 
overcoming that hurdle may be especially difficult. If other steel 
producers additionally use specialized software, not commercially 
available but designed in-house, to track inventory, control the 
manufacturing process, or otherwise reduce production costs, the 
potential entrant would also benefit from obtaining a license to 
similar software or developing such software itself because it will 
enable the entrant to compete more effectively. While enabling the 
entrant to gain access to a manufacturing plant may be the most 
significant way to make market entry easier, a license to the 
relevant software is another mechanism for lowering the barriers to 
entry.
80
 
b. Lower an Existing Competitor’s Costs 
Second, a compulsory license to an existing competitor can 
enable the competitor to constrain the merged firm’s prices. In 
some instances, an existing competitor can compete effectively on 
product features without repositioning its product, and therefore, a 
license to the merged firm’s intellectual property for those 
purposes is unnecessary. The competitor’s cost structure, however, 
may be such that it cannot compete effectively with the merged 
firm on price. In those cases, a compulsory license to the merged 
firm’s intellectual property can lower the competitor’s costs, which 
will enable the competitor to lower its prices, thereby discouraging 
the merged firm from raising its prices post-merger. Providing a 
license to an existing competitor may be an especially useful tool 
                                                                                                             
 80. In instances where lack of access to real assets, such as a manufacturing 
plant, is the most significant barrier to entry and divestiture of those assets is an 
appropriate remedy, providing an entrant with a compulsory license to the 
merging firm’s intellectual property will additionally enable those divested 
assets to be viable. See FTC DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 74, 16, 28 (noting 
in a 1999 study of the divestiture process that some divestiture packages “were 
not adequate to fully achieve the remedial purpose of the Commission’s orders” 
and, more specifically, that divested assets were not always viable as a business 
because the divestiture did not include access to related assets, including 
“necessary technology”). 
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for restoring premerger prices or preventing prices from increasing 
in the first place when new entry is unlikely or impossible. 
c. Costless To Provide 
Third, in most, if not all, cases, a license to intellectual 
property will be the most efficient way to lower barriers to entry or 
otherwise constrain the merged firm’s prices. Intellectual property 
is nonrivalrous and nonexclusive—the practice of a patented 
invention by one firm, for example, does not prevent another firm 
from practicing it and from doing so simultaneously. Moreover, 
the merged firm’s marginal cost of providing a license to a third 
party is close to zero. In contrast, other means of lowering barriers 
to entry or lowering a competitor’s costs—such as the divestiture 
of a manufacturing plant,
81
 the provision of technical assistance,
82
 
or the provision of incentives to employees to encourage them to 
seek and accept employment with the entrant
83—can be quite 
costly. Thus, when compared to other mechanisms for restoring 
competition, a compulsory license may be the preferred 
mechanism. 
2. Costs of a Compulsory License 
Compulsory licenses, however, are not necessarily harmless to 
the relevant market or markets. In light of the revised Merger 
Guidelines’ recognition that mergers may have positive innovation 
effects, one cost that should be of particular concern to the 
agencies is that a compulsory license might diminish innovation. 
                                                                                                             
 81. See, e.g., Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid 
Public Comment, In re Universal Health Services, Inc. and Psychiatric Solutions, 
Inc., Docket No. C-4309, at 1 (F.T.C. Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.ftc. 
gov/os/caselist/1010142/101115uhspsianal.pdf (requiring divestiture of, among 
other things, four psychiatric facilities, eleven clinics, and all related real 
property).  
 82. See, e.g., Analysis of Proposed Agreement Containing Consent Orders 
to Aid Public Comment, In re Novartis AG, Docket No. C-4296, at 3 (F.T.C. 
Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1010068/index.shtm 
(proposing that Novartis provide technical assistance in the manufacture of 
pharmaceutical product to the purchaser of divested assets). 
 83. See, e.g., Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid 
Public Comment, In re AEA Investors 2006 Fund L.P., HHI Holding 
Corporation, and Houghton International, Inc., File No. 081-0245, at (F.T.C. 
July 14, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0810245/100709 
aeahoughtonanal.pdf (proposing that the merging firms “remove any contractual 
impediments that may deter the former . . . employees [of one of the merging 
firms] from accepting employment with the Commission-approved buyer”). 
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There are at least three classes of innovation effects, which are 
considered further below. In sum, a compulsory license may effect 
a decrease in consumer welfare by deterring the merged firm from 
innovating; reducing the licensee’s incentives to innovate; or 
signaling to other market participants, thereby discouraging them 
from investing in R&D and innovating. 
a. Change the Incentives of the Merged Firm 
Perhaps most significantly, requiring the merged firm to 
license its intellectual property to a third party will likely change 
the market dynamics and, therefore, it may change the incentives 
of the merged firm to innovate. As discussed above, a compulsory 
license lowers barriers to entry, thereby enabling a new firm to 
enter the market or an existing competitor to reposition an existing 
product. The end result is more competition in the post-merger 
market. The critical issue is whether more post-merger competition 
will effectively diminish the merged firm’s incentive to undertake 
the R&D activities enabled by the merger. Stated another way: 
Will more competition, made possible by a remedial compulsory 
license, harm innovation and effectively undo the benefits of the 
merger? In essence, this is the heart of the Schumpeter–Arrow 
debate. 
It is conceivable that, at least in some cases, a compulsory 
license could diminish the merged firm’s incentives. An example 
illustrates the point. Consider the case where two firms that 
compete in a product market, Market A, seek to combine their 
assets, including their intellectual property portfolios and their 
R&D capabilities, to develop a new product that will occupy and 
compete in Market B. Consider further that, absent the merger, the 
two firms would have continued to improve their existing products 
in Market A. The merger may result in two types of 
anticompetitive effects. First, the merger will eliminate 
competition between the two firms in Market A and, consequently, 
could result in higher prices for products in Market A in the short 
run. Second, the merger could eliminate competition between the 
two firms at the innovation level, which could delay the 
introduction of new or improved products, as well as price 
reductions, in Market A (and possibly other markets). 
On the other hand, the merger will enable innovation that 
would not otherwise be possible. When the two firms’ patent 
portfolios are combined, the new firm will be able to undertake 
R&D projects and develop a product (or products) that would not 
be possible without use of both firms’ intellectual property. This 
new product will compete in Market B, and depending on how 
2012] COMPULSORY LICENSING AS MERGER REMEDY 629 
 
 
 
drastic the innovation, it may be the only product in Market B. The 
Merger Guidelines recognize such innovation as a potential benefit 
of a merger.
84
 
The enforcement agencies may seek to preserve the expected 
benefits while attempting to mitigate the potential harm by 
insisting that one or both of the merging firms license their 
intellectual property to a third party. If the merging firms 
endeavored to create an entirely new product—and did not 
anticipate that others would be able to do the same and enter the 
market—their incentive to innovate was likely the anticipation of 
monopoly profits in the new market, at least for a short time. 
After the imposition of a compulsory license, however, the 
merged firm’s incentive to innovate may be significantly 
diminished. Although the purpose of a license may be to maintain 
competition in Market A, a licensee may be able to use the 
licensed technology to innovate and develop a competing product 
in Market B.  If Market B can support more than one competitor, 
the merged firm faces the possibility of sharing the market with the 
licensee and capturing a smaller percentage of the market—and 
profits—than it had anticipated. Worse yet, if Market B is a 
winner-take-all or winner-take-most market,
85
 the merged firm 
faces the possibility of losing the competition with the licensee and 
earning no profits at all. Either way, the merged firm will have less 
incentive after the imposition of a compulsory license than it did 
before.
86
 
                                                                                                             
 84. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 6.4 (“The 
Agencies also consider whether the merger is likely to enable innovation that 
would not otherwise take place, by bringing together complementary capabilities 
that cannot be otherwise combined or for some other merger-specific reason.”); 
see also Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, at 52 (“Assessments of efficiency 
benefits for innovation will, therefore, likely turn on the analysis of whether the 
merger under consideration allows the combination of complementary assets 
that would not otherwise be combined through a means posing less of a threat to 
competition.”). 
 85. For example, a market might be winner-take-all or winner-take-most if 
the competition is for a military contract or the new product will exhibit network 
effects, such that the market can only support a few standards, at most. 
 86. This analysis assumes that, prior to the widespread application of the 
use of compulsory licenses, the merging firm had no reason to believe that a 
compulsory license might be imposed and therefore could not factor that risk 
into its analysis. After widespread application of the practice, however, this 
possibility should factor into the merging firms’ analysis of the benefits of 
merging, as well as whether to undertake an R&D project. The availability of a 
compulsory license as a merger remedy likely improves the chances that a 
merger will be approved, albeit conditionally. On the other hand, the 
compulsory license could substantially decrease the payoffs of the merger and 
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Whether a compulsory license will undermine the merged 
firm’s incentive to innovate will likely turn on the premerger 
market dynamics and their relationship to the merging firms’ 
incentives. Therefore, as with a competitive effects analysis, a 
more thorough analysis is warranted and that analysis should take 
account of uncertain outcomes in multiples dimensions. 
b. Change the Incentives of the Licensee  
The virtue of a compulsory license is that it lowers the barriers 
to entry by giving the licensee access to inputs without which a 
licensee could not compete or could do so only after expending 
significant resources. After the licensee obtains access to the 
intellectual property and enters the market (or repositions an 
existing product), the licensee no longer has the incentive to 
develop the input itself. This, of course, is the objective of the 
compulsory license in the first place—to enable the entrant to 
avoid the investment of time, money, or other resources to develop 
the input so as to make entry into the market easier and to enable 
the entrant to be profitable at premerger prices. The entrant, 
engaged in competition with the merged firm, may then be 
incentivized to innovate further to “escape” the competition and 
surpass its competitor.
87
 In this respect, a compulsory license goes 
beyond restoring competition and affirmatively spurs innovation.
88
 
Indeed, if the entrant intends to remain a viable competitor, it will 
almost definitely have to continue to innovate, releasing new or 
improved products and services. In the words of Microsoft CEO 
Steve Ballmer, “technology companies either move forward[] . . . 
or they die.”89 
                                                                                                             
 
R&D undertaking. The long-term effects of a compulsory license on the 
incentives of potential merging partners are considered further, below. 
 87. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 9, at 579–80 (explaining that “competition 
among rivals producing an existing product encourages those firms to find ways 
to lower costs, improve quality, or develop better products,” and thereby “escape 
competition”); Phillippe Aghion et. al., Competition, Imitation and Growth with 
Step-by-Step Innovation, 68 REV. ECON. STUD. 467, 468 n.4 (2001) (discussing 
“escape competition”). 
 88. Cf. Howard A. Shelanski, Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual 
Property and Other Property, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 369, 371 (2009) (noting that 
denial of access to intellectual property in the upstream market can have 
“harmful dynamic effects” in the downstream market, in the context of a refusal 
to deal). 
 89. Ashlee Vance, Forecast for Microsoft: Partly Cloudy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
18, 2009, at B1. 
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On the other hand, it is possible that, in the long run, the 
licensee’s incentives may be diminished or, at the least, 
unchanged.
90
 It is plausible that, by virtue of the compulsory 
license, the licensee is able to earn larger than expected profits in 
the short run in a market in which it had not anticipated competing. 
This may be enough for the licensee. Rather than invest in 
innovations building off of the licensed intellectual property, the 
licensee may be content to pocket the short run gains and phase out 
the product that competed with the product of the merged firm. 
Indeed, phasing out the product may be the most cost-effective 
decision for the licensee—investments to develop new or improved 
products are risky, at best, and the licensee, having not developed 
the first generation innovation itself, might very well lack 
important know-how and expertise, making the chances of a 
successful second generation innovation even less likely.
91
 This 
may be particularly true for firms that compete in multiple product 
markets, so that the death of one product or division is not the 
death of the firm. 
To be sure, the divestiture of real assets to a third party can 
similarly serve to undermine the productive incentives of the 
assets’ purchaser. For example, the purchaser of a manufacturing 
plant has less incentive to invest in developing an efficient, 
suitable manufacturing facility after it purchases the merged firm’s 
facilities. In this respect, the threat or imposition of a compulsory 
license does not uniquely undermine the incentives of purchasers 
to invest in innovative and productive endeavors. Moreover, 
because intellectual property rights can potentially erect an 
insurmountable legal barrier—when, for example, the intellectual 
property rights cannot be invented around—it may be that, when 
compared to another remedy such as the divestiture of real assets, a 
compulsory license is more justified.
92
 But this comparison does 
not suggest that a compulsory license is beneficial to consumers in 
                                                                                                             
 90. Cf. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (explaining in the context of a refusal to deal claim 
that compelling a firm with monopoly power to share the source of their 
competitive advantage may “lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or 
both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities” (emphasis added)). 
 91. It is also possible that, rather than succeeding in the newly entered 
market, the entrant fails successfully to transform the license and other resources 
into a competitive, viable business, and the new business, in fact, fails. See 
generally FTC DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 74 (discussing conditions that 
make the failure of a divested business more likely). In that case, the entrant 
may be just as likely, if not more likely, to conclude that it makes economic 
sense to cut its losses and exit the market because of its lack of know-how and 
expertise. 
 92. See Shelanski, supra note 88, at 385–86. 
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every case. All this comparison suggests is that a compulsory 
license may, in some instances, be less costly than other reasonable 
means for reaching a negotiated settlement. 
c. Change Incentives of Market Participants over Time  
In addition to changing the incentives of the merged firm and 
the licensee, a compulsory license may, in the long run, have a 
signaling effect in the market more generally, discouraging other 
market participants from innovating. In theory, the use of a 
compulsory license as a remedial tool could affect innovation 
incentives in the long run in at least two ways. 
First, the use of a compulsory license as a remedial tool could 
make merging seem less attractive and consequently discourage 
mergers and the innovations that are enabled only through merger. 
Once a compulsory license becomes an established remedial tool, a 
firm considering an acquisition that presents competitive issues 
and involves valuable intellectual property should consider the 
likelihood that the acquisition will be permitted only if a 
compulsory license is granted to a third party. Insofar as the 
compulsory license will diminish the expected value of the merged 
firm’s anticipated innovations, the potential acquirer should 
discount the value of the acquisition accordingly. Depending on 
how significantly a compulsory license changes the expected value 
of the merged firm’s anticipated innovations, the possibility of the 
remedy could discourage the firm from attempting to acquire the 
target firm. As a result, consumers may be deprived of the 
innovation the merged firm would have undertaken. 
Second, if firms are discouraged from making acquisitions 
when a compulsory license is a possible remedy, firms that 
undertake R&D investments with an eye toward being acquired 
may be discouraged from making those investments in the first 
place. Thus, in the long run, consumers may be deprived not only 
of the merged firm’s potential innovations but also the target firm’s 
innovations. 
To be sure, in practice, these negative innovation effects may 
be unlikely, at least with respect to the second type of effect. At the 
point of an initial R&D undertaking, the target firm (likely a start-
up) faces a number of uncertainties. R&D entails a great deal of 
risk, and the start-up will have no way of knowing if its R&D 
efforts will result in a useful and valuable innovation. In addition, 
even if the start-up’s R&D efforts prove successful, it is not a 
foregone conclusion that there will be a purchaser waiting in the 
wings. Moreover, technology-based markets are dynamic—some 
technologies and the products incorporating them become 
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incredibly popular and their success results in the elimination of 
competing technologies and products, while others combine with 
new technologies, resulting in entirely new products and markets.
93
 
This dynamism makes it difficult to identify, ex ante, the market 
participants in the future relevant market (or markets), the pool of 
future potential buyers, and the competitive concerns that could 
arise during a merger review. 
Therefore, at the time the potential partners are contemplating 
whether to merge, the possibility of a compulsory license may 
reduce the value of the target firm and deter the firms from 
merging and undertaking the R&D projects enabled by the merger. 
However, it may also be the case that, at the prior point in time, 
when the target firm is deciding whether to undertake an initial 
R&D project, the possibility of a compulsory license at some time 
down the road may be too remote and too conditional for it to 
make any real difference to the target firm’s decision. But without 
a more thorough analysis, it is difficult to know which way the 
scale will tip. 
To take full account of both the beneficial and harmful 
innovation effects of a potential remedial compulsory license—
resulting from the changed incentives of the merged firm, the 
licensee, and other market participants, more generally—the 
agencies should conduct a thorough, fact-intensive analysis. That 
analysis should include consideration of uncertain, more distant 
outcomes. As discussed further below, decision theory is well 
suited for that task. 
III. DECISION-THEORETIC APPROACH TO THE REMEDY PHASE OF 
MERGER ANALYSIS 
Decision theory is an economic tool for making decisions 
under uncertainty. A decision-theoretic approach based on 
expected utility theory enables the decision maker to quantify the 
expected value of the various courses of action that the decision 
maker could take, compare those expected values, and choose the 
course of action that will yield the highest expected value. The 
expected value of a given course of action is determined by 
identifying all the possible outcomes that can flow from a given 
decision, assessing the value of each possible outcome, weighting 
                                                                                                             
 93. See generally W. BRIAN ARTHUR, THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGY: 
WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT EVOLVES (2009).  
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each outcome by the probability the outcome will occur, and 
summing those values.
94
 
Merger review, in general, involves a great deal of uncertainty. 
Consistent with Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the Merger 
Guidelines seek to identify anticompetitive mergers in their 
incipiency.
95
 Merger analysis, therefore, “is necessarily predictive, 
requiring an assessment of what will likely happen if a merger 
proceeds compared to what will happen if it does not.”96 Merger 
efficiencies, in particular, are difficult to verify and quantify,
97
 and 
innovation only adds to the uncertainty.
98
 Merger review is 
therefore especially well suited for the tools of decision theory.  
The revised Merger Guidelines attempt to take account of this 
uncertainty in at least a couple of ways. For example, unlike the 
1992 Merger Guidelines, which consider as a mitigating factor 
only entry into the relevant market that is likely to occur within 
two years,
99
 the revised Merger Guidelines do not specify a precise 
time within which entry must occur; they indicate only that “entry 
must be rapid enough to make unprofitable overall the actions 
causing” the competitive effects of concern.100 In addition, whereas 
the 1992 Merger Guidelines gave less weight to efficiencies that 
                                                                                                             
 94. The process can be further refined (and complicated) by taking account 
of the decision maker’s utility function—i.e., the decision maker’s taste for risk 
and preference for certain outcomes versus other outcomes. 
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (prohibiting acquisitions where, “in any line of 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, 
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to 
tend to create a monopoly” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Penn-
Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170–71 (1964), aff’d, 389 U.S. 308 (1967) 
(concluding that the “grand design” of Section 7 of the Clayton Act was “to 
arrest incipient threats to competition”); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 
U.S. 294, 323 (1962) (“Congress used the words ‘may be substantially to lessen 
competition’ . . . to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not 
certainties.”). 
 96. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 1; see also id. 
(“Given this inherent need for prediction, these Guidelines reflect the 
congressional intent that merger enforcement should interdict competitive 
problems in their incipiency and that certainty about anticompetitive effect is 
seldom possible and not required for a merger to be illegal.”). 
 97. See id. § 10. 
 98. Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, at 56. Katz and Shelanski point out that 
(1) R&D is necessarily an uncertain pursuit, the benefits of which may not be 
apparent for a long period of time; (2) innovation incentives are imperfectly 
known; (3) assessing net consumer benefits can be difficult where consumers 
have heterogeneous valuations of the fruits of innovation; and (4) small 
investments can generate a large increase in consumer surplus. 
 99. 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 68, § 3.2. 
 100. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 9.1. 
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occurred more remotely in the future,
101
 the revised Merger 
Guidelines consider both the “likelihood” and the “magnitude” of 
the efficiencies asserted by the merging firms.
102
 In at least these 
ways, the revised Merger Guidelines accord with a decision-
theoretic approach. 
However, as mentioned above, although the revised Merger 
Guidelines recognize that both anticompetitive effects and 
efficiencies can “operate along multiple dimensions,”103 it is 
entirely unclear how these varying effects—e.g., price and output 
on the one hand, versus innovation, on the other hand—will be 
balanced against each other. And even if the effects occur along 
the same dimension, it is not clear how, if at all, they will be 
balanced against each other when they arise in different markets, 
thereby implicating Philadelphia National Bank’s no-cross-
market-balancing rule. 
Moreover, it is not clear from the revised Merger Guidelines 
whether the agencies take account of the additional uncertainty a 
proposed remedy injects into the analysis. To the extent the 
agencies account for the uncertain outcomes of proposed remedial 
mechanisms when contemplating whether to negotiate a settlement 
with potential merging parties or, alternatively, to seek an 
injunction enjoining the merger, that should be reflected in the 
                                                                                                             
 101. 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 68, § 4 n.37. 
 102. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES supra note 24, § 10. In 
determining whether a merger is, on balance, anticompetitive, the revised 
Merger Guidelines reflect the agencies’ apparent policy decision to take greater 
precaution to avoid false negatives—i.e., mistakenly allowing an 
anticompetitive merger to proceed unchallenged. The agencies do not simply 
compare the anticompetitive effects against the verifiable efficiencies. Rather, 
the greater the expected harm, the more the efficiencies must exceed the 
expected harm: 
In conducting this analysis [of efficiencies], the Agencies will not 
simply compare the magnitude of the cognizable efficiencies with the 
magnitude of the likely harm to competition absent the efficiencies. 
The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the 
greater must be the cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must be 
passed through to customers, for the Agencies to conclude that the 
merger will not have an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. 
When the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger is likely to 
be particularly substantial, extraordinarily great cognizable efficiencies 
would be necessary to prevent the merger from being anticompetitive. 
Id. (emphasis added). This reflects the agencies’ preference for false positives 
(mistakenly challenging a procompetitive merger) over false negatives 
(mistakenly not challenging an anticompetitive merger). A decision-theoretic 
approach does not preclude consideration of the preferences of the decision-
making body; rather, it merely further refines the process. See supra note 94. 
 103. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 24, § 10; see also 
id. § 6. 
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Merger Guidelines. But to the extent that is not the practice of the 
agencies, it should be. 
Specifically, the agencies should extend the decision-theoretic 
analysis to include consideration of the potential outcomes that can 
flow from a proposed remedy—a compulsory license, in 
particular—as well as the expected value of those outcomes. If the 
expected value of imposing a certain remedy does not improve the 
expected value of allowing the merger to proceed unchallenged, 
then the agencies should seek a full-stop injunction (or consider an 
alternative remedy). 
The application of decision theory to the remedial phase of a 
merger analysis can be illustrated by examining the 2004 merger 
between Genzyme Corporation and Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. The Genzyme–Novazyme merger is an interesting and 
especially useful case to examine because of the merger’s effects 
on innovation and because the FTC appears to have contemplated, 
but ultimately rejected, a compulsory license as a potential remedy. 
In addition, in an article that pre-dates the revisions to the Merger 
Guidelines, Katz and Shelanski recommend that the agencies use 
the tools of decision theory to refine the analysis of mergers, and 
they apply their recommendations to the Genzyme-Novazyme 
merger.
104
 Their analysis can be extended to include consideration 
of a compulsory license as a potential remedial mechanism. 
The Genzyme–Novazyme merger involved a merger between 
the only two firms engaged in researching and developing an 
enzyme-replacement treatment for Pompe disease, a rare and fatal 
disease that afflicts mostly infants and children.
105
 By a divided 
vote, the FTC decided to close its investigation and permit the 
merger to proceed unchallenged,
106
 thereby essentially approving a 
merger to monopoly. 
                                                                                                             
 104. Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, at 81–84. 
 105. Statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris in the Matter of Genzyme 
Corporation/Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 12, at 6. 
 106. The Commission vote was 3-1-1. Three Commissioners, including 
Chairman Muris, voted in favor of closing the investigation. See id.; see also 
Press Release, FTC Closes its Investigation of Genzyme Corporation’s 2001 
Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Jan. 13, 2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/01/genzyme.shtm. 
Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson voted in favor of issuing an 
administrative complaint challenging the merger and issued a dissent. Dissenting 
Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, Genzyme Corporation’s 
Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals Inc., supra note 12. 
Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour joined the Commission after the 
investigation had already begun and, therefore, she did not formally participate 
in the vote. She did, however, release her own statement in support of 
Commissioner Thompson’s dissent. Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones 
2012] COMPULSORY LICENSING AS MERGER REMEDY 637 
 
 
 
Chairman Timothy J. Muris issued a statement in support of 
the majority’s decision.107 His statement is notable for a few 
reasons. First, his analysis is based on the merger’s likely effects 
on innovation to the exclusion of its likely effects on price and 
output.
108
 Second, Chairman Muris undertook a fact-intensive 
analysis rather than an analysis based on presumptions related to 
market concentration. Specifically, Chairman Muris considered the 
nature of R&D related to pharmaceuticals, in particular the high 
failure rate, the past experiences and success of the merging 
parties, how the merger was likely to affect the incentives of the 
merging firms to innovate, whether the merger would enable the 
firms to “conduct R&D more successfully,” and the effects a 
compulsory license would have on the incentives of the merging 
firms to innovate.
109
 Third, he estimated the probability of the 
harms and benefits from allowing the merger to proceed and 
approximated the net value of the merger.
110
 
Specifically, Chairman Muris contemplated two possible 
outcomes flowing from allowing the merger to proceed: 
Genzyme’s internal R&D efforts could either fail or succeed. He 
assigned the possibility of failing a 25% probability, in which case 
he concluded Genzyme would pursue the alternative Novazyme 
program and the benefit to patients would be “large.” In addition, 
he assigned the possibility of succeeding a 75% probability, in 
which case Genzyme might have had an incentive to pursue the 
Novazyme R&D program more slowly to prevent any resulting 
innovations from cannibalizing the rewards of the Genzyme 
program; Muris estimated that was very unlikely. From this 
estimate, Muris concluded that the merger was likely to benefit 
patients.
111
 Katz and Shelanski summarize Muris’s analysis as 
follows: 
 
(.25) * (large benefit) – (.75) * (small harm)112 
 
                                                                                                             
 
Harbour, Genzyme Corporation’s Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals 
Inc., File No. 021-0026 (FTC Jan. 13, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2004/01/harbourgenzymestmt.pdf. 
 107. See generally Statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris in the Matter of 
Genzyme Corporation/Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 12. 
 108. See id. at 5–6. 
 109. Id. at 5–21. 
 110. Id. at 19–20. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, at 84. 
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Katz and Shelanski commend Muris’s approach, in general; 
however, they note a few problems with Muris’s methodology. 
First, because the Genzyme–Novazyme merger was a merger to 
monopoly, Katz and Shelanski would have presumed the merger 
was harmful, and therefore the merging firms would have had to 
establish lack of harm. Second, Muris makes no inquiry into 
whether the “large” benefits to patients in the first state of the 
world (Genzyme’s internal R&D efforts fail, Novazyme program 
produces large benefits) are merger-specific; to the extent they are 
not, they should be discounted. Third, they argue that Muris’s 
estimation that the harm in the second state of the world 
(Genzyme’s internal R&D efforts succeed) is likely to be small is 
not well justified. Muris concludes that there is a small possibility 
of Genzyme pursuing the Novazyme program more slowly, and 
from this he infers a small harm. Katz and Shelanski argue that this 
leaves out an important step: Muris should have additionally 
estimated the magnitude of the harm likely to occur if Genzyme 
did, indeed, delay the Novazyme program, and it is this number 
that should be multiplied by the low probability Muris estimated. 
Moreover, Katz and Shelanski note that Muris did not consider the 
merger’s effects on the product market; these effects could be quite 
significant in the second-generation product market given that the 
merger will result in a monopoly in the first generation product 
market.
113
 
If this revised analysis had indicated that the merger was likely 
to be anticompetitive, the FTC would have had to consider an 
appropriate remedy. To the extent the agency sought to preserve 
the benefits of the merger (as well as other efficiencies not 
otherwise reflected in the above equation
114
), while mitigating the 
harms, including possible harmful price and output effects in the 
second generation product market, a compulsory license to one of 
the merging parties’ Pompe-related intellectual property would 
have been an appropriate remedy for the FTC to consider. 
A thorough analysis of the remedy would have considered the 
possible harms and benefits of the remedy, as well as the 
magnitude of those harms, and incorporate them into the analysis 
                                                                                                             
 113. Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, at 84–85. Katz and Shelanski do not 
note, however, how these different types of effects, arising in different markets, 
will be balanced against each other. 
 114. See Statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris in the Matter of Genzyme 
Corporation/Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 12, at 17 (noting that 
the merger “made possible comparative experiments and provided information 
that enabled the Novazyme program to avoid drilling dry holes” and additionally 
“made possible synergies that [would] help avoid a delay in the Novazyme 
program”). 
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of the merger. Before undertaking that analysis, it is important to 
note two challenges in evaluating a potential remedy presented by 
the Genzyme-Novazyme merger. 
First, because Pompe disease affects a relatively small number 
of individuals, therapies developed to treat it are covered by the 
Orphan Drug Act (ODA). Under the ODA, the first firm to develop 
a therapy for a rare disease or condition receives seven years of 
market exclusivity. That exclusivity may be broken only by a 
competing therapy that is proven clinically superior.
115
 Because of 
the therapy’s superiority, most, if not all, of the patients using the 
old therapy will likely switch to the new therapy;
116
 the new 
therapy will consequently capture most (if not all) of the market. 
Therefore, the market for Pompe therapies could have been 
described as winner-take-all. 
Second, the FTC’s investigation of the merger was initiated 
shortly after the consummation of the merger, but it was not until 
more than two years later that the FTC decided to drop its 
investigation.
117
 At the time of the merger, there was no Pompe 
therapy on the market, but by the time the investigation was 
dropped, Genzyme had successfully brought a therapy to 
market.
118
 
Because of the winner-take-all nature of the market, as well as 
the possibility of a displacing second generation therapy, the 
timing of the remedy matters. Had the FTC considered requiring 
the merged firm to license its intellectual property to a third party 
or else face a challenge to the merger soon after the merger was 
consummated and before a therapy had reached the market, a 
license could have created competition between the merged firm 
and the licensee to be the first to market.
119
 Although a license has 
                                                                                                             
 115. See, e.g., id. at 11; see also DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT: IMPLEMENTATION 
AND IMPACT (May 2001), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-
00380.pdf. 
 116. Cf. Statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris in the Matter of Genzyme 
Corporation/Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 12, at 13 n.37 
(concluding that, if the merger had not taken place, it was unlikely that retaining 
Pompe patients would have served as an incentive for Genzyme to get its 
therapy to market as quicky as possible: “if a Novazyme product was 
sufficiently superior to break ODA exclusivity, it is not credible simply to 
suggest that Genzyme’s first mover advantage would render doctors and patients 
unwilling to switch to Novazyme’s product.”). 
 117. See id. at 1, n.1, & 8. 
 118. See id. at 8–9. 
 119. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, 
Genzyme Corporation’s Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals Inc., supra 
note 12, at 4–7. But see Statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris in the Matter 
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the potential to undermine the innovation incentives of the merging 
firm in a winner-take-all market, because the merger had already 
been consummated, it was unlikely that the Genzyme-Novazyme 
merged firm would have chosen to abandon the R&D of a Pompe 
therapy. Moreover, a license would have enabled competition 
between the merged firm and the third-party licensee to develop a 
clinically superior second generation Pompe therapy.
120
 
Even if the FTC had decided to negotiate with the merged firm 
after a Pompe therapy was already on the market, a compulsory 
license could have enabled competition between the merged firm 
and the licensee to develop a clinically superior second generation 
therapy. Thus, it seems that regardless of when a compulsory 
license would have been imposed, it likely would have been 
beneficial to consumers. 
In his statement, Chairman Muris considered a compulsory 
license to a third party covering the Pompe-related intellectual 
property.
121
 But, because Chairman Muris’s analysis of the merger 
excluded consideration of the merger’s effects on the product 
market, it was therefore incomplete. Because his analysis indicated 
a net benefit to patients, his consideration of the possible effects of 
a compulsory license was also incomplete. He focused only on the 
way in which the remedy would undermine the benefits the merger 
would otherwise produce. He considered neither the potential 
benefits of a compulsory license in the product market nor the 
potential benefits resulting from the licensee’s innovation. A 
thorough analysis, including an analysis of the proposed remedy, 
would consider both the remedy’s harms and benefits. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
of Genzyme Corporation/Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 12, at 22 
(disagreeing with the dissent: “[T]he evidence indicates that absent the merger, 
Genzyme’s and Novazyme’s R&D would not have been influenced substantially 
by efforts to increase their probabilities of being first to market.”). 
 120. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, 
Genzyme Corporation’s Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals Inc., supra 
note 12, at 7. 
 121. Commissioner Muris’s statement confusingly refers to a “nonexclusive 
license to the Novazyme product, such as the Dissent suggests.” Statement of 
Chairman Timothy J. Muris in the Matter of Genzyme Corporation/Novazyme 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 12, at 21 (emphasis added). However, in his 
dissent, Commissioner Thomas clearly refers to “licensing intellectual 
property.” Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, 
Genzyme Corporation’s Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals Inc., supra 
note 12, at 13. Therefore, it seems likely that Commissioner Muris similarly had 
the licensing of intellectual property in mind. 
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IV. MODEL SCENARIOS: A DECISION-THEORETIC APPROACH IN 
PRACTICE 
Although a decision-theoretic approach could be used in every 
case in which a compulsory license is contemplated, the marginal 
improvements to the decision-making process may be less 
significant in some cases. This Part attempts to identify those 
scenarios in which a decision-theoretic approach would be most 
beneficial. In sum, it concludes that the tools of decision theory are 
likely to improve the decision-making process most when analysis 
of the merger indicates dynamic benefits to innovation.  
A. Anticompetitive Effects to Static Price and Output Effects, with 
No Expected Benefits to Innovation 
Where the merger analysis indicates that the merger is likely to 
result in higher prices or reduced output, and there are no expected 
innovation benefits of the merger, a compulsory license will very 
likely be beneficial to consumers.
122
 
In this case, competition occurs at the product level. Because 
there are no expected innovation effects from the merger, the firms 
likely do not compete at the innovation level or are not expected to 
compete at the innovation level. But if they do compete at the 
innovation level, the competition between the firms is not very 
intense. Innovation is therefore likely an upstream input into a 
downstream product, where the competition between the firms 
primarily occurs. 
A compulsory license to one or both of the merging firms’ 
intellectual property will lower the barriers to entry. There may be 
other barriers to entry as well, and access to the merging firms’ 
intellectual property alone may be insufficient to make entry into 
the relevant market likely. But a compulsory license will likely be 
the most efficient mechanism to lower those barriers. 
For example, consider the case where two firms that compete 
at the product level seek to merge to realize cost savings, and one 
of the firms holds intellectual property rights covering internally 
developed software that tracks inventory. If the enforcement 
agency concludes that the merger is going to reduce product 
competition and therefore harm consumers, the agency may 
                                                                                                             
 122. See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, at 61. Katz & Shelanski recognize 
that a licensing remedy may be appropriate when “a proposed merger . . . raises 
significant concerns of harm to static price and output competition,” but they 
make no mention of what the merger analysis reveals about the merger’s 
anticipated innovation effects. 
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approve the merger only if one or both of the firms divests a 
manufacturing plant to a third party. In addition, the enforcement 
agency may insist that the merging firms grant the third party a 
license to the inventory-tracking software. The divestiture of the 
manufacturing plant is likely the most significant way to lower the 
third party’s barriers to entry. The software license, however, can 
additionally enable the third party to operate the manufacturing 
plant more efficiently and, therefore, compete more effectively. In 
addition, it is relatively costless to the merging firms. 
B. Anticompetitive Effects to Innovation 
Similarly, when an analysis of the merger reveals that the 
merger is likely to harm innovation—regardless of whether the 
merger is likely to cause short-term price and output effects—a 
compulsory license to the merging firms’ intellectual property is 
unlikely to harm consumers. 
In this case, competition occurs at the innovation level. 
Because the merger is likely to harm innovation, the firms may be 
competing with each other to be the first to launch a new product 
that defines a new market. Alternatively, they may already 
compete intensely with each other and, but for the merger, one 
dimension of that competition may take the form of developing 
and releasing new and improved products. In the latter case, 
competition additionally occurs at the product level, and the 
merger likely has anticompetitive price and output effects as well. 
In cases where there are anticompetitive innovation effects, a 
compulsory license to the merging firms’ intellectual property will 
lower barriers to entry. In the absence of such a license, a firm that 
sought to enter the market would either have to invent around the 
merging firms’ intellectual property rights or, to the extent there 
exists other intellectual property that can serve as a substitute for 
that of the merging firms, seek a license. This can be both 
expensive and time consuming, and as a result, may prevent the 
entrant from offering competitive prices or restoring competition 
timely enough to prevent significant harm to consumers. 
The model example is a merger to monopoly in the product 
market. The merger would not only reduce competition at the 
product level, but it would also diminish the merged firm’s 
incentive to innovate because future innovations would cannibalize 
the monopolist’s present sales. Although the incentive to develop a 
first generation innovation can be quite significant because of first-
mover advantages, particularly if the innovator does not 
immediately anticipate competitors, when it comes to second 
generation innovations—i.e., innovations adding onto, improving, 
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or otherwise building off of the prior technology—competition is 
more important.
123
 
The 2009 merger between Ticketmaster Entertainment and 
Live Nation is illustrative. For more than two decades, 
Ticketmaster dominated the market for “primary ticketing 
services”—i.e., the market for services that facilitate the initial sale 
of tickets to concertgoers. Ticketmaster controlled more than 80% 
of the market, while the next largest firm in terms of market share 
controlled only 4% of the market.
124
 Live Nation had been the 
largest concert promoter and owned or operated about 70 major 
concert venues in the United States, and, in 2008, Live Nation was 
Ticketmaster’s largest customer.125 After spending more than two 
years “evaluating, licensing, and developing” a platform that could 
compete with Ticketmaster’s, in December 2008, Live Nation 
entered the market for primary ticket services.
126
 While 
Ticketmaster’s other competitors faced high barriers to entry—
including Ticketmaster’s established reputation that made it 
difficult for new entrants to secure long-term contracts with major 
concert venues—Live Nation was vertically integrated, which 
enabled it to achieve sufficient scale by simply ticketing its own 
venues. Unlike Ticketmaster’s other competitors, Live Nation did 
not need to secure long-term contracts with other major concert 
venues. Live Nation was therefore best positioned to challenge 
Ticketmaster; indeed by 2009, Live Nation had captured more than 
15% of the market.
127
 Less than two months after Live Nation 
began ticketing with its new platform, Ticketmaster sought to 
acquire Live Nation.
128
 
                                                                                                             
 123. See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 9, at 29. In addition, monopolists may 
invest resources to obtain intellectual property rights with the sole purpose of 
excluding rivals by making entry more difficult. Moreover, Katz and Shelanski 
suggest that “a firm that lacks rivals against which to benchmark itself may be a 
less efficient innovator.” Id. 
 124. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Ticketmaster 
Entertainment, Inc., NO. 1:10-CV-00139, 2–3, 8–9 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f254500/254544.pdf; Complaint, 
United States v. Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., NO. 1:10-CV-00139, ¶¶ 2, 21 
(D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f254500/ 
254552.pdf. 
 125. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Ticketmaster 
Entertainment, supra note 124, at 4–5, 9. 
 126. Complaint, United States v. Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., supra 
note 124, ¶ 3.  
 127. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Ticketmaster 
Entertainment, Inc., supra note 124, at 9–11.  
 128. Id. at 11. 
644 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
After reviewing the merger, the DOJ concluded that the loss of 
competition between Ticketmaster and Live Nation would likely 
result in higher prices and less innovation.
129
 At the same time, the 
parties asserted that the merger would cut out the number of 
middlemen that needed to be compensated, which would 
ultimately reduce the prices paid by venues for primary ticketing 
services and by consumers for tickets.
130
 To remedy the 
anticompetitive effects of the merger,  the DOJ proposed a multi-
pronged remedy, which included requiring Ticketmaster to provide 
a third party, Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. (“AEG”), with 
its own branded website based on Ticketmaster’s technology 
“including any upgrades and enhancements” to the technology for 
up to five years.
131
 As with a traditional license, AEG is required to 
pay a “royalty” for use of the technology, but that royalty is below 
the competitive price Ticketmaster otherwise charges.
132
 In 
addition, Ticketmaster was required to provide AEG with “an 
option to acquire a perpetual, fully paid-up license to the then-
current version of Ticketmaster’s [technology], including a copy of 
the source code,” as well as technical support for the first six 
months.
133
 Because the merger was anticipated to cause harmful 
effects to innovation, a compulsory license to Ticketmaster’s 
intellectual property, aimed at restoring both the product and 
innovation competition lost as a result of the merger, was justified. 
C. Anticompetitive Effects to Static Price and Output Effects; 
Expected Benefits to Innovation 
The hardest case is presented by those mergers that are likely 
to raise prices or reduce output, while also promising to enable 
innovation that is possible only through merger. 
In this case, a more thorough analysis is warranted. While a 
compulsory license can be effective in replacing the competition 
lost as a result of the merger, thereby preventing prices from rising 
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. at 2, 11. Specifically, the DOJ concluded that the merged firm would 
have “reduced incentives to develop new features.” Id. at 11. 
 130. Id. at 12. It should be noted that the agency did not “fully credit” the 
parties’ efficiency claims “because they each could realize many of the asserted 
efficiencies without consummating the proposed transaction.” The Ticketmaster-
Live Nation merger was reviewed under the 1992 Merger Guidelines, which, 
like the revised Merger Guidelines, arguably credit only those efficiencies that 
are “merger-specific.” Although beyond the scope of this Article, this raises the 
noteworthy issue of why the merger was allowed to proceed at all, even if the 
anticompetitive effects of the merger could be effectively remedied.  
 131. Id. at 13–14. 
 132. Id. at 14. 
 133. Id. 
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and output from decreasing, at the same time, it can undercut the 
merging firms’ incentives to innovate, particularly if the necessary 
investment is significant and the expected return significantly 
diminished with increased competition. The Genzyme–Novazyme 
merger is an example of a merger that presented difficult issues 
regarding the merger’s net value, warranting a more thorough 
analysis. 
One particularly difficult case, mentioned above, is where the 
merged firm’s innovation is likely to create a new product in a 
winner-take-all market. On the one hand, increased competition at 
the existing product level can prevent prices for those products 
from rising. In addition, more competition at the innovation level 
may deliver the new product to consumers sooner and allow 
consumers to choose the superior technology.
134
 
On the other hand, if the market is truly winner-take-all, the 
merged firm faces the risk of losing that competition and recouping 
very little, if any, of its investment. As a result, the merging firms 
may choose to abandon the project (or the merger) completely, 
resulting, possibly, in a complete loss of the innovation. 
If the enforcement agency truly believes that the innovation 
benefits are worth preserving, one possible solution is a 
compulsory license with a field of use restriction, permitting the 
licensee to practice the inventions disclosed in the patent or patents 
for the limited purpose of competing in the present product market, 
but prohibiting the licensee from practicing the invention for any 
other purpose.
135
 
                                                                                                             
 134. This is not necessarily the case. The winning product is not always the 
superior product for a number of reasons, including band-wagon effects, first-
mover advantage, or availability of complementary products. For example, in 
the war between the Betamax and VHS standard, Betamax was considered the 
superior technology, but the standard lost out to VHS for at least a couple of 
reasons, including the limited availability of complementary products (i.e., 
recorded programs on the Betamax standard) and the 60-minute tape length. See, 
e.g., Peter Passell, Why the Best Doesn’t Always Win, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1996 
(Magazine). 
 135. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO 
MERGER REMEDIES, supra note 69, at 11 n.23 (“When a patent covers the right 
to compete in multiple product or geographic markets, yet the merger adversely 
affects competition in only a subset of these markets, the Division will insist on 
the sale or license of rights necessary to effectively preserve competition in the 
affected markets. In some cases, this may require that the purchaser or licensee 
obtain the rights to produce and sell only the relevant product. In other 
circumstances, it may be necessary to give the purchaser or licensee the right to 
produce and sell other products (or use other processes), where doing so permits 
the realization of scale and scope economies necessary to compete effectively in 
the relevant market.” (emphasis added)). 
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This solution has its own limitations, however. To the extent 
the merged firm continues to make improvements to its existing 
product—while attempting to develop an entirely new product—
the licensee will likewise need to make improvements to the 
existing product to remain competitive. Often, those improvements 
will build upon—and therefore continue to practice—the existing 
technology, such that the licensee will be unable to further 
innovate without a license permitting those improvements. In 
theory, the original license could be further tailored to permit such 
improvements; in practice, this may be very difficult, as the line 
between where an improvement ends and a new product begins 
may be hard to draw. 
CONCLUSION 
It is possible that the dynamic effects of a compulsory license 
are, in fact, insubstantial. This is possible for at least two reasons. 
First, although a compulsory license may diminish the merging 
firms’ incentives to innovate, the incentives may nonetheless be 
sufficiently great that very few, if any, R&D projects are 
abandoned. Alternatively, it is possible that, even if a compulsory 
license forces potential merging partners to abandon a merger or a 
potential R&D project, those projects were not going to enhance 
consumer welfare significantly anyway. Given the agencies’ 
apparent risk aversion and preference for false positives 
(mistakenly preventing a procompetitive merger) over false 
negatives (mistakenly allowing an anticompetitive merger), the 
loss of those low-valued R&D projects may be of no concern.
136
 
However, in the absence of any analysis by the agencies, it is 
difficult to know. Therefore, at least in the short run, the agencies 
should undertake a more thorough, fact-intensive analysis of the 
effects of a compulsory license on the relevant market or markets. 
The results of these analyses, together with the actual effects in the 
relevant markets, will provide fodder for further, empirical 
analyses. From these analyses, the agencies can draw fact-based 
conclusions about the effects of such a remedy and create useful 
presumptions that can be used in future evaluations of a potential 
merger and the effectiveness of a compulsory license. 
 
* * * 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 136. See supra note 102 (discussing the agencies’ apparent preference for 
false positives).  
